Part 9 of 12 · 2 min read
Mistakes that leave a threat model incomplete
Common mistakes, and what the example does not do.
Mistakes that leave a threat model incomplete
- Starting from tools or attacks instead of assets and goals.
- No trust boundaries on the diagram, or the model drawn as one trusted box.
- Forgetting memory, traces, vector stores and third-party services.
- One-off threat model never updated.
- Listing threats without decisions, owners or tests.
- False precision from made-up probabilities.
- Counting similar mitigations as independent.
- Ignoring egress and focusing only on inbound threats.
What the example does not do
About this example What the example does not do
- Fictional system and assumed numbers; nothing here is evidence about real systems.
- STRIDE counts are mechanical: many of the 46 threats are duplicates or low impact, and a human must judge them.
- Only inbound trust gaps are flagged; the email flow leaves the boundary and needs a separate egress rule.
- No scoring framework (CVSS, DREAD) and no sensitivity analysis of the probabilities.
- Probabilities are treated as independent across leaves; real attackers adapt and steps correlate.
- Brute-force cut search is fine for seven controls and impractical for hundreds.
- No tool support such as a threat-modelling tool or MAESTRO templates.
- Optional real experiment: threat-model a real agent with a colleague in one hour, record the top five threats and decisions, and check each against a test.
Check yourself
You list the threats and mitigate each one separately. What does that miss?
Show answer
Shared controls. Least privilege cut two attack paths at once; picking mitigations is a covering problem, not a per-threat checklist.
For the curious A model is only as good as its inputs
For the fictional system, one control at a time left 33.2 percent (egress allowlist), 28.9 percent (least privilege) and 33.2 percent (quarantine) success for the attacker; all seven controls left 0. The cheapest set that blocked every path cost 5 of 12. The probabilities and costs are the assumptions: the value is the structure and the trace from threat to control to test.
What you will use daily at work
| Practice | What it looks like |
|---|---|
| Draw the data flows and trust boundaries | Then ask what can go wrong at each. |
| Add prompt injection to the list | Any flow from less trusted data into a model. |
| Give each threat a decision | Mitigate, accept, transfer or avoid; with an owner. |
| Link each control to a test | Red-team cases in the next module. |