CSE Roadmap

Common tier · about 3 hours · 12 parts

Part 9 of 12 · 2 min read

Mistakes that leave a threat model incomplete

Common mistakes, and what the example does not do.

Mistakes that leave a threat model incomplete

  • Starting from tools or attacks instead of assets and goals.
  • No trust boundaries on the diagram, or the model drawn as one trusted box.
  • Forgetting memory, traces, vector stores and third-party services.
  • One-off threat model never updated.
  • Listing threats without decisions, owners or tests.
  • False precision from made-up probabilities.
  • Counting similar mitigations as independent.
  • Ignoring egress and focusing only on inbound threats.

What the example does not do

About this example What the example does not do
  • Fictional system and assumed numbers; nothing here is evidence about real systems.
  • STRIDE counts are mechanical: many of the 46 threats are duplicates or low impact, and a human must judge them.
  • Only inbound trust gaps are flagged; the email flow leaves the boundary and needs a separate egress rule.
  • No scoring framework (CVSS, DREAD) and no sensitivity analysis of the probabilities.
  • Probabilities are treated as independent across leaves; real attackers adapt and steps correlate.
  • Brute-force cut search is fine for seven controls and impractical for hundreds.
  • No tool support such as a threat-modelling tool or MAESTRO templates.
  • Optional real experiment: threat-model a real agent with a colleague in one hour, record the top five threats and decisions, and check each against a test.

Check yourself

You list the threats and mitigate each one separately. What does that miss?

Show answer

Shared controls. Least privilege cut two attack paths at once; picking mitigations is a covering problem, not a per-threat checklist.

For the curious A model is only as good as its inputs

For the fictional system, one control at a time left 33.2 percent (egress allowlist), 28.9 percent (least privilege) and 33.2 percent (quarantine) success for the attacker; all seven controls left 0. The cheapest set that blocked every path cost 5 of 12. The probabilities and costs are the assumptions: the value is the structure and the trace from threat to control to test.

What you will use daily at work

Practice What it looks like
Draw the data flows and trust boundaries Then ask what can go wrong at each.
Add prompt injection to the list Any flow from less trusted data into a model.
Give each threat a decision Mitigate, accept, transfer or avoid; with an owner.
Link each control to a test Red-team cases in the next module.