CSE Roadmap

Common tier · about 3 hours · 12 parts

Part 8 of 12 · 2 min read

Answering threat-modelling questions in an interview

How do you threat-model an agent?

"I list assets and attacker goals, draw a data-flow diagram with trust boundaries including the model, tools, memory and traces, enumerate threats with STRIDE plus agent-specific ones such as prompt injection and excessive agency, and prioritise by trust-boundary crossings without controls and by impact. For key goals I build an attack tree and search for the cheapest set of controls that cuts every path. Then I turn each control into a test." Follow-up: "What is different about agents?" Untrusted text can become actions, autonomy and tools widen the attack surface, and memory and traces create new data stores; the book's MAESTRO framework adds layers for these.

Why use an attack tree?

"It makes the attacker's options explicit as AND and OR steps, so I can compute likelihood and cost and see which control cuts several paths. In the example's example a least-privilege control cut both the injection and credential paths and appeared in the cheapest blocking set." Follow-up: "Where do the probabilities come from?" From incident data where it exists, expert estimates otherwise; I mark them as assumptions and test sensitivity, because the ranking can change.

You cannot stop the model from following injected instructions. What then?

"Break another step in the chain: no private data in the same session, no outbound channel, or an approval on the sending action. In the example's tree the 'model obeys' step stayed unmitigated and the goal was still blocked." Follow-up: "Is that enough?" It blocks the modelled paths; unknown paths remain, so I add monitoring and red-teaming (module 8).

STRIDE or something else?

"STRIDE is a good checklist for components and flows. For agents I extend it with injection and excessive-agency threats and look at layered frameworks such as MAESTRO, which the book describes as seven layers from foundation models to the agent ecosystem. The framework matters less than doing it early, with the diagram, and keeping it current." Follow-up: "What about scoring?" Scores such as CVSS or DREAD give a sort order, not an objective risk; I use them for triage and show assumptions.