CSE Roadmap

Core tier · about 4 hours · 13 parts

Part 6 of 13 · 1 min read

What the example found

Wrongly-allowed attacks per check design, and the resource-limit probes that actually ran.

How to read the checks table: each row is a check design against its own attack set; the second column is how often it wrongly let an attack through, the first how often it correctly allowed legitimate input.

Check Legitimate allowed Attacks wrongly allowed
Paths: startswith(root) 100% 80% (8 of 10)
Paths: normalise only 100% 30% (3 of 10)
Paths: realpath + commonpath 100% 0%
URLs: "contains" 100% 80%
URLs: string prefix 33% 30%
URLs: parsed host allowlist 100% 0%
Commands: startswith 100% 100% (9 of 9)
Commands: program and argument allowlist 100% 0%

What to notice: the strong check in every category (resolve-then-compare for paths, parse-then-compare for URLs, allowlist-then-match for commands) reaches 0% wrongly allowed while losing nothing on legitimate input. There's no inherent trade-off between safety and usability here, only a trade-off between a cheap string check and a slightly more careful one.

How to read the probes table: each row is a resource-limited child process actually run on this machine.

Probe Observed result
while True: pass killed at 1.02 s (CPU limit 1 s)
2 GB bytearray MemoryError (limit 256 MB)
50 MB file write File too large (limit 1 MB)
sleep(60) timed out at 5 s (wall clock)
Read SECRET_TOKEN "not visible" scrubbed; "hunter2" inherited

What to notice: every one of these five probes is a different kind of runaway behaviour (CPU, memory, disk, wall-clock, information disclosure). Each is stopped by a different, independent setting. There is no single "sandbox switch." Each row is its own control that has to be turned on deliberately.

{{svg:layers|Four layers: tool arguments, process limits, isolation boundary, network egress.}} {{svg:results|Wrongly allowed attack inputs per check, and the probes that ran.}}