CSE Roadmap

Core tier · about 4 hours · 13 parts

Part 10 of 13 · 2 min read

Mistakes that leave the sandbox with a hole

Common mistakes, and what the example does not do.

Mistakes that leave the sandbox with a hole

  • startswith path checks without resolving.
  • shell=True with model-generated text.
  • Inheriting the parent environment, including secrets.
  • Only a timeout (no memory or file limits) or only CPU limits.
  • Open network from the sandbox.
  • Shared long-lived sandboxes that keep state between users.
  • Mounting the host home or Docker socket into the container.
  • Validating a URL once and following redirects blindly.
  • Treating rlimits as isolation.

What the example does not do

About this example What the example does not do
  • No container, VM, seccomp or network namespace; only argument checks and process limits.
  • Linux only, and RLIMIT_AS behaves differently across systems and runtimes.
  • No limit on process count (a fork bomb is a real risk; the example deliberately did not run one) and no CPU-time accounting for child processes of the child.
  • No TOCTOU defence, no redirect or DNS-rebinding handling, no Unicode or case-folding attacks on paths and hosts beyond what the tests show.
  • Hand-written, small attack lists; passing them is not proof of safety.
  • Optional real experiment: run the same probes inside a container with --network none, --read-only, --pids-limit and --memory, and compare.

Check yourself

A path check uses startswith(root). What can still escape?

Show answer

A prefix collision such as ../work-evil, and symlinks. It wrongly allowed 80 percent of the 10 escape attempts; realpath plus commonpath allowed none and still accepted all 6 legitimate paths.

For the curious Limits are not isolation

CPU, memory, file and time limits stop denial of service; the infinite loop was killed after 1.02 s by a 1 s CPU limit. But a limited process can still read any file its user can and open network connections. Only a boundary (container, microVM, separate user, no network) stops data access. Layers 1 and 2 were tested on Linux; container and network isolation were not built, and the check-then-use race is not handled.

What you will use daily at work

Practice What it looks like
Validate paths and URLs first Resolve symlinks, then check inside the root.
Set CPU, memory, file size and wall-clock limits Plus a clean environment with no inherited secrets.
Run model-written code in a boundary Container or microVM, read-only root, no host mounts.
Deny network by default Allow only listed destinations.