CSE Roadmap

Core tier · about 5 hours · 14 parts

Part 6 of 14 · 2 min read

What the example found

The eight-attack matrix across five setups, the control-by-control ablation, and the approval-prompt counts.

How to read the attack-matrix table: each row is one of five ways to set up the same support agent; the columns summarise what happened across the same eight scripted attacks and seven honest tasks.

Setup Attacks that did harm Rows changed Sensitive values exposed Refunded Honest tasks done
A: SQL, read-write 8 of 8 24 11 5000.00 7 of 7
B: SQL, read-only connection 2 of 8 0 11 0 4 of 7
C1: narrow, standing grant, attentive approver 0 of 8 0 0 0 6 of 7
C2: narrow, standing grant, rubber-stamp approver 1 of 8 2 0 0 6 of 7
C3: narrow, task-only grant, rubber-stamp approver 0 of 8 0 0 0 6 of 7

What to notice: setup B stops every write yet still leaks all 11 sensitive values and fails 3 of 7 honest tasks. "Read-only" was a permission on the connection, never a limit on what could be read. So it manages to be both unsafe and less useful than the narrow design at the same time.

How to read the ablation table: starting from setup C2, each row switches off one control and reruns the same eight attacks.

Control switched off What gets through What it tells you
none "close all": 2 rows the baseline: the write quota limits it
scope + reading the card endings the permission check was what kept payment data out of a support task
row check + a note on another customer's ticket (3 rows) without it the agent could act on anyone's data
quota "close all" rises to 3 rows the quota was the limit on repeated changes
request validation (the cap) a refund of 5000 the cap is the only thing between a "yes" click and the money
approval nothing changes the person said yes to everything, so they added no safety

What to notice: every row removes exactly one gate and nothing else. Every row except "approval" lets something new through. The approval row is the one piece of direct evidence that, in this setup, the human control was doing none of the actual work.

How to read the approval-load table: each row is a different policy for when the gateway asks a person, run against the same assumed 100-task mix.

Policy Prompts per 100 tasks
approve nothing 0
approve every call 100
approve every change (notes, closes, refunds) 40
approve closes and refunds only (the example) 15

What to notice: the module's chosen policy (15 prompts) asks for barely a sixth of what "approve every change" would (40). It asks for a fifteenth of "approve every call" (100). The gap between these numbers is the entire argument for being selective about what triggers a prompt.

{{svg:blast|Which attacks did harm under each setup}} {{svg:gateway|Every call passes the same ten gates}} {{svg:controls|Approval load and the value of each control}}