CSE Roadmap

Common tier · about 4 hours · 4 parts

Part 3 of 4 · 2 min read

Exercises

Easy

Easy 1: Run it (30 minutes)

Run python -m pytest -q and python run_all.py in code/mini-support.

Done when: you can explain why guarded cost more than autonomous at accuracy 0.88.

Hint

guarded escalates most refunds because of the $50 cap.

Easy 2: Change a penalty (30 minutes)

Raise the wrong-action penalty to $100 and re-run.

Done when: you report which policy becomes cheapest and why.

Easy 3: Classify commands (30 minutes)

Add ten commands from your own system to ops.py samples.

Done when: you list any it classifies wrongly and fix one rule.

Medium

Medium 1: Calibrated confidence (3 hours)

Replace the uniform confidence distributions with one calibrated to your own numbers (for example correct answers centred at 0.85).

Done when: you re-plot the threshold sweep and explain how the cliff moved.

Hint

calibration is the whole game: measure it from real traces.

Medium 2: Per-intent thresholds (3 hours)

Give each intent its own threshold and cap.

Done when: you show total cost falls versus a single threshold.

Hint

reversible intents (address change) can tolerate lower thresholds than refunds.

Medium 3: Handoff quality (3 hours)

Add a suggested action and a priority to the packet and test it against a simple human-model that resolves faster with a good packet.

Done when: human minutes per escalation fall in your simulation.

Hard

Hard 1: Shadow mode on real tickets (8 hours)

Run a real classifier on real historical tickets without acting. (I did not run this, so your numbers are the ground truth.)

Done when: you report accuracy, calibration, wrong-action rate and the cost table.

Hard 2: Multi-turn tickets (8 hours)

Extend the agent to ask one clarifying question when two intents are plausible. (I did not run this.)

Done when: you show automation rises without more wrong actions.

Hard 3: Operations sandbox (8 hours)

Put the operations policy in front of a real sandboxed shell in a container. (I did not run this.)

Done when: a destructive command is blocked at both the policy and the container permission level.

Hint

defence in depth: the container's permissions are the last line, not the regex.