CSE Roadmap

Core tier · about 4 hours · 13 parts

Part 10 of 13 · 2 min read

Mistakes that widen an agent's blast radius

Common mistakes, and what the example does not do.

Mistakes that widen an agent's blast radius

  • One shared admin key for all agents.
  • A shell tool "for flexibility".
  • No expiry or use limit on grants.
  • Trusting the system prompt ("never delete") as a control.
  • Forgetting escalation: a write-to-config tool that can add roles.
  • Granting by tool name, ignoring arguments (any recipient, any amount).
  • Sub-agents inheriting everything.
  • No monitoring of denied calls.

What the example does not do

About this example What the example does not do
  • No real identity or access system; the grant model is a sketch of the idea.
  • Attenuation compares glob patterns approximately; a pattern like a/* versus a/b* is not fully analysed.
  • The attacker is a random or greedy caller, not an adaptive planner who chains tools.
  • Damage is a single number with money and non-money units mixed by assumption.
  • The escalation graph is hand-made and small.
  • Optional real experiment: audit a real agent's credentials and tools, list what each can reach, and recompute the worst case with real damage estimates.

Check yourself

An agent is fully compromised. What decides how much damage it can do?

Show answer

Its privileges. In the model, one service account had a worst case of 27,187 units, scoped tools 4,530, and per-task grants far less. The damage units are assumptions.

For the curious Least privilege has a price, so measure it

Per-task grants completed 88 percent of legitimate tasks. The missing 12 percent were refunds above the cap of 50, which belong with a human approval (next modules), not with a wider grant. Also look at escalation: a general shell reached 9 capabilities by escalation in the small graph, scoped tools 2, per-task grants 1.

What you will use daily at work

Practice What it looks like
Give the specific tool, never a general shell A shell reaches secrets, config and then admin.
Narrow five ways Resource, action, amount, time and number of uses.
Deny by default Anything not granted is refused.
Cap irreversible actions Approval or a limit, even if the credential allows it.