Part 9 of 12 · 2 min read
Mistakes that leave an approval meaningless
Common mistakes, and what the example does not do.
Mistakes that leave an approval meaningless
- An
approved=Trueflag in the agent's state. - Approving a model-written summary.
- Reusable or never-expiring approvals.
- Not binding the arguments, so "approve a $5 refund" authorises any refund.
- Requester can approve own request.
- Executor shares the signing key with the agent process.
- No state check between approval and execution.
- Approval prompts with unescaped model text.
- Treating approval as a substitute for least privilege (module 2).
What the example does not do
About this example What the example does not do
- No real approval UI, identity provider or authentication of the approver; "alice" is a string.
- Symmetric HMAC: anyone with the key can mint approvals; asymmetric signing is not implemented.
- In-memory nonce store, so a restart forgets used tokens and a cluster would need a shared store.
- No atomicity between the state-version check and the action.
- No tests of timing side channels beyond using a constant-time comparison.
- Attacks written for the example against the example's own code.
- Optional real experiment: show the rendered prompt to colleagues with and without the warnings, with one malicious request among ten, and compare how many they catch.
Check yourself
A human approves a refund of 50, and the agent executes a refund of 5,000. What stops it?
Show answer
The approval is bound to the exact action: a signed token covers the action name and a hash of the arguments, so a changed amount fails verification.
For the curious A token proves what was approved, not that approving was wise
All ten attacks on the token scheme failed, including a replay, self-approval, a high-risk action with one approver and an order that changed after approval. A false denial is the price: 50 and 50.0 hash differently. A stolen signing key, a compromised approval screen, a human who approves everything, and a misleading screen are not solved by tokens. These are the example's own attacks on the example's own code.
What you will use daily at work
| Practice | What it looks like |
|---|---|
| Sign the exact arguments | Name, argument hash, session, expiry, one-time nonce. |
| Build the approval screen from the arguments | Never from text the model wrote. |
| Separate requester and approver | High-risk actions need two distinct approvers. |
| Bind to a state version | If the order changed, deny and ask again. |