Part 9 of 12 · 2 min read
Accountability and escalation: common mistakes
Common mistakes, and what the example does not do.
Mistakes that make accountability hollow
- Logging for debugging only, with no schema, owner or retention.
- Logs that the agent can write to or delete.
- A hash chain with no anchor, assumed to be immutable.
- No severity definitions until the incident.
- One on-call person and repeated pages.
- Escalation judged by the model alone.
- Kill switch that stops the chat but not the tools.
- A breaker threshold chosen without baseline traffic.
- No owner for approvals or incident response.
What the example does not do
About this example What the example does not do
- In-memory log, one writer, no concurrency, no rotation, no storage guarantees.
- The anchor is a Python tuple; a real anchor needs a separate trusted system.
- Simulated people and attacks: availability, rates and flagged fractions are assumptions; real paging has sleep schedules, shared channels and alert fatigue.
- Severity weights are arbitrary, not calibrated against an organisation's risk appetite.
- The breaker counts events in a sliding window, with no per-user or per-tool scoping.
- No legal, regulatory or contractual analysis of responsibility.
- Optional real experiment: run a game day on a real agent: trigger a synthetic SEV2, time the acknowledgement, use the kill switch and reconstruct the incident from the audit log alone.
Check yourself
Who is accountable when an agent causes harm?
Show answer
A named human or team in the organisation. The agent cannot be accountable, and you need logs to show what happened.
For the curious A hash chain is not enough
Of five tampering attacks, a plain log detected 0. A hash chain detected edits, deletion and reordering but not tail truncation or a full rewrite by someone who recomputes the hashes. Re-paging the same person every 15 minutes never reached a human in 10 percent of incidents at 90 percent availability, and 30 percent at 70 percent. The attack, availability and traffic here are simulated.
What you will use daily at work
| Practice | What it looks like |
|---|---|
| Log nine fields for each consequential action | Who, action, argument hash, decision, approver, model and prompt version, trace id, time. |
| Write the severity rule before an incident | Impact, reach and reversibility to SEV1 to SEV4. |
| Escalate to a rota, not a person | Re-page a different person if nobody answers. |
| Add a circuit breaker with a named human reset | It halts the agent after N suspicious events. |