CSE Roadmap

Core tier · about 4 hours · 9 parts

Part 4 of 9 · 2 min read

Service to service

Calls inside the network need trust too.

BM asks how one service should authenticate to another, and lists options.

Option How it works Main limits
Trust everything inside the network Calls from inside the perimeter are assumed safe An attacker who gets in can read, change or fake traffic (a man-in-the-middle attack). BM calls it the most common model and worries that it is often unconscious
HTTP Basic over HTTPS Username and password in a header Must use HTTPS or the password is visible. Certificates must be managed. TLS traffic cannot be cached by reverse proxies unless TLS ends at a load balancer. Only proves the caller knows the password
SAML or OpenID Connect Use the existing identity system, with a service account per service Needs secure credential storage. Clients can be hard to code (SAML) or poorly supported (OpenID Connect)
Client certificates Each client has a certificate checked through TLS Strong guarantees, but certificate management is heavy and diagnosing rejected certificates is slow. Used for very sensitive data or networks you do not control
HMAC signing Hash the request body with a shared private key and send the hash Detects tampering and never sends the key. Needs a shared secret, is a pattern not a standard, and body stays visible. BM points to Amazon S3's approach and to JSON web tokens, and warns that one missed boolean check in a token library can break all authentication
API keys A key identifies the caller and limits what it may do, including rate limits Keys must be issued, stored and managed centrally

BM's advice on service accounts: keep each narrow. Give each microservice its own credentials, so that if one leaks, only that set needs revoking.

Check yourself: 1. Why is "trust everything inside" risky? 2. Why give each service its own credentials? 3. What does HMAC prove, and what does it not hide?